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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVIANCE 
Abstract 
 
We develop the concept of corporate governance deviance and seek to understand why, 
when, and how a firm adopts governance practices that do not conform to the dominant 
governance logic.  Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with the entrepreneurship and 
corporate governance literatures, we advance a middle range theory of the antecedents of 
corporate governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level 
agency.  Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts 
with the national governance logic to jointly create corporate governance discretion (i.e., the 
latitude of accessible governance practices) within the firm.  We argue that as a firm’s 
governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt over- or under-conforming 
governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices.  Moreover, we propose 
that adopting a deviant corporate governance practice is contingent on the governance regulatory 
environment and a firm’s corporate governance capacity.  We conclude by advancing a new 
typology of corporate governance deviance based on a firm’s over- or under-conformity with the 
dominant national logic, as well as its entrepreneurial identity motives.  This globally-relevant 
study refines and extends comparative corporate governance research and enriches our current 
understanding of the institutional logics perspective.  
 
Keywords: Comparative Corporate Governance, Governance Discretion, Governance Capacity, 
Corporate Governance Deviance; Institutional Logics, Entrepreneurial Identity. 
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Most comparative governance research assumes that national institutions determine firm-
level corporate governance practices (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).  Recent research has begun to document, however, that some firms’ 
practices do not always acquiesce to these pressures (Bednar, Love, & Kraatz, 2015; Chizema, 
Liu, Lu, & Gao, 2015).  Remarkably, this literature has not yet focused much on the logically 
prior questions of why, when, and how firms are likely to deviate from an economy’s legitimate 
governance practices, and to adopt practices that are non-conforming.   
The extant literature also fails to account for the fact that some firms deviate by adopting 
governance practices that fall short of the country’s governance standards (under-conform), 
while other firms deviate by exceeding these prevailing governance norms (over-conform).  For 
example, consider the corporate governance practice of board composition in the context of the 
U.S. shareholder-oriented logic.  In spite of the prevailing logic that U.S.-based boards should be 
composed of a majority of outsiders, some pre-IPO firms operate with a majority of insider 
directors, thereby under-conforming with respect to the dominant governance logic (Garg, 2013).  
Conversely, other firms removed all inside directors except the CEO and over conform to 
prevailing norms (Joseph, Ocasio & McDonald, 2014).  We refer to both of these situations as 
intentional deviations from standards set by the legitimate practices and normative expectations 
advanced by the dominant national governance logic as corporate governance deviance. 
To understand why, when, and how firms engage in governance deviance, we develop a 
middle range theory of corporate governance deviance which draws on institutional research and 
turns our attention to the notion of entrepreneurial identity.  Although there is a rich literature in 
institutional theory on the complexity of the institutional field (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011), institutional pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) and the presence 
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of co-existing institutional logics (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012), we are primarily 
interested in the firm’s agentic deviant behavior within the context of the prevailing country-
level governance logic.  By stipulating this boundary condition, we are able to push forward the 
discussion on the classic debate in institutional theory regarding the tension between the 
dominant institutional pressure and agentic behavior (Zucker, 1991), and encourage its empirical 
testing and falsification.   
While the institutional literature has made impressive strides in enhancing our 
understanding of organizational behavior and outcomes, we believe that this literature has 
become too centered on institutional forces and in turn pays less attention to organizational 
forces.  In effect, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) long ago urged institutional scholars to bring 
organizational agency and interests back into the study of institutional processes, in order to 
better delineate the link between micro- and macro-levels of analysis.  Recently, Greenwood, 
Hinings, and Whetten (2014) have criticized the institutional literature for focusing too much on 
external institutional forces and neglecting our understanding of organizational agency, and we 
concur with their viewpoint.   
Thus, in this study, we advance an organizational agentic-based view within an 
institutional pressure to conform by advancing a middle range conceptual model that explains the 
antecedents of organizational deviance.  In particular, our framework seeks to uncover the 
precursors of corporate governance deviance within the context of a specific national governance 
logic.  To do so, we integrate national-level forces and firm-level socio-cognitive agentic 
behavior and seek to explain why most firms conform yet some firms do not conform to 
institutional pressures.  We rely on the socio-cognitive stages of agency (Thornton, et al., 2012) 
yet we place the concept of entrepreneurial identity (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011; Navis & Glynn, 
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2010) at the core of our process model.  We conceptualize entrepreneurial identity as the 
organizational self-claims associated with the willingness to take risks, be proactive, and seek 
innovation.  Our fundamental insight is that the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity is 
the key trigger of governance deviance because it grants more meaning to deviant behavior than 
the meaning provided by the prevailing governance logic.  
To work with the construct of deviance, we depart from the seminal sociological 
understanding of deviance behavior (Merton, 1938) as an individual action that violates social 
norms including formally enacted rules as well as informal nonconformity.  While Merton 
(1968) also utilizes a middle range approach to develop his strain theory of socially deviant 
behavior by individuals, more recent organizational research expands on Merton’s work by 
exploring organizational deviance as a creative opportunity (Mainemelis, 2010).  We build on 
extant research on organizational deviance (Heckert & Heckert, 2002; Mitchell & Ambrose, 
2007; Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004; Warren, 2003) to characterize corporate governance 
deviance as a firm’s intentional adoption of governance practices driven by its entrepreneurial 
identity. 
Our conceptual argument to understand the source, evolution, and ultimate form of 
governance deviance is based on the following three stages in the socio-cognitive process 
towards deviant behavior (Thornton et al., 2012).  First, we maintain that firms go through an 
awareness stage where they begin to recognize alternative governance practices.  Second, we 
argue that firms in which entrepreneurial identity is more central to their core identity consider a 
greater range of practices and move to a stage where deviance becomes more accessible than do 
firms in which entrepreneurial identity is less central.  Third, we claim that a deviant practice is 
more likely to be adopted in the activation stage, when governance discretion falls outside the 
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legitimate practices specified by the prevailing governance logic.  In addition, based on the 
comparative governance literature, we believe that two contingencies are likely to influence the 
activation of governance deviance: the extent of regulatory enforcement within the dominant 
governance logic, and firms’ governance capacity to implement new governance practices.  We 
conclude by advancing a typology of corporate governance deviance in which we posit that 
firms’ entrepreneurial identities define their motives for engaging in non-conforming practices—
allowing us to refine our notion of deviance through over- and under-conformity.  
Based on these core claims, we make several contributions in this multi-level study of 
governance deviance.  First, we push the frontiers of comparative corporate governance research 
by proposing a more holistic, yet nuanced categorization of dominant governance logics present 
in a wide variety of national economies.  Second, we enrich and extend institutional research by 
examining the coalescence of firm entrepreneurial identity as the primary driver of 
organizational agency, with institutional pressures to conform.  Third, we respond to calls for 
more contextually-embedded examinations of entrepreneurship (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008) and 
connect those insights to the deployment of governance practices.  And finally, we advance a 
new typology of corporate governance deviance that can guide future research. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 In this section, we present the building blocks of our conceptual model.  We begin by 
discussing how the prevailing national logic translates into a single dominant governance logic 
within each national context by combining economic sociology with comparative governance 
literature.  We also articulate the primary boundary condition underlying our middle range theory 
of corporate governance deviance.  Second, we refine and extend the institutional logics 
perspective (Thornton et al., 2012) by describing the stages of the socio-cognitive process that 
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we draw on to explain why firms adopt deviant governance practices.   
From Institutional Logics to National Governance Logics 
 Institutional logics are the socially-constructed assumptions, values, beliefs, formal and 
informal rules, and practices that equip organizations with a toolkit to interpret their experiences, 
direct their attention towards specific choices, define future goals, and limit their potential 
organizational choices (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 
2012).  Thus, institutional logics directly shape organizational action through the process of 
category identification and attention structuring.  Although logics operate at different levels, we 
draw on Friedland and Alford’s (1991: 232) foundational thesis that societal institutions and 
their underlying institutional logics influence organizational interests. We agree with their central 
premise that national-level logics are the key institutional level mechanism defining normative 
and regulative organizational governance practices (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007) as well as 
prescribing social legitimacy norms (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).   
Ample research demonstrates that nation-state institutional logics strongly affect 
organizational outcomes and their legitimation.  Examples include the organization of railroads 
(Dobbin, 1994) and inter-organizational learning effectiveness across technological areas 
(Vasudeva, Alexander, & Jones, 2015).  These studies demonstrate the non-trivial role of 
national institutional logics, illustrating that organizations tend to adopt nationally-scripted 
practices and operate within an acceptable zone of conformity1 (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015:353).  We 
define organizational behavior and practices falling within the zone of conformity as those that 
adhere to the dominant legitimate logic.  
                                                            
1 We see “zone of conformity” as a similar term to what Simon (1945) referred as a “zone of acceptance;” Barnard 
(1938) discussed as a “zone of indifference;” and Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, (2006) articulated as a “range of 
acceptability.”  We restrict its meaning to be relative to a specific dominant governance logic.  
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 A challenge in comparative corporate governance research has been to advance existing 
typologies of corporate governance systems beyond the shareholder-stakeholder-oriented models 
(Aguilera & Jackson, 2010) in order to include emerging and transition markets which occupy an 
increasingly large portion of today’s global economy.  We draw on notions of national 
institutional logics from political economy and economic sociology (Smelser & Swedberg, 2010) 
to derive four ideal-type national governance logics pertaining to how firm resources and 
authority are created, retained, and distributed within a national setting.   
In particular, we seek to expand the shareholder-stakeholder dichotomy to propose that 
the pillars of state, market, and society shape one another historically in significantly different 
ways that in turn generate unique country-level institutionalized logics.  Indeed, O’Riain (2000) 
combines these three pillars to identify four types of national economies: a liberal type that 
promotes market dominance, a social rights type that sets social limits to market strategies, a 
developmental type in which market strategies are coordinated by the state and society, and a 
socialist type in which the state seeks to retain power and to subsume market and society.  We 
propose that each of these four national institutional logics embraces a distinct governance logic 
capturing the rights and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the firm, and the salience of 
each pillar.  
The liberal country type endorses a shareholder-oriented governance logic where the 
market defines the firm’s primary goal and its governance, prioritizing the maximization of 
shareholder value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) to provide firms with legitimacy.  This logic is 
predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries.  Countries assigned to this type follow detailed and 
precise binding governance regulation (i.e., “hard law”) such as the United States’ 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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The social rights country type adopts a stakeholder-oriented governance logic 
prototypical of Germany where the primary goal of the firm and its governance is to balance the 
interests of all stakeholders involved in the firm (Jackson, 2005).  These countries tend to enact 
more flexible governance regulation based on “comply or explain” codes of good governance, 
which exert normative pressure to adopt certain practices in line with the country’s governance 
logic (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  Several economies within Western Europe, such as 
Germany, Sweden, and Spain, follow this governance logic.   
The developmental country type adopts a relational-oriented governance logic where the 
firm’s primary goal is to contribute to the country’s economic development.  This hybrid 
governance logic aspires to incorporate values, norms, and beliefs from the stakeholder and 
shareholder governance logics, but has also historically nurtured strong relational ties to other 
economic actors to which it must attend (Chang, 2003; Schneider, 2013).  Countries with a 
relational logic are likely to develop more flexible, multi-tiered norms, such as the varying levels 
of governance requirements offered to firms listed on the Brazilian stock exchange or different 
normative expectations for South Korea’s core (chaebols) versus peripheral firms. 
Finally, the socialist country type adopts a statist-oriented governance logic where the 
primary goal of the firm and its governance is to perpetuate state authority and power in the 
overall economy (Pearson, 2005).  To ensure its fulfillment, prototypical countries such as China 
and Russia function within an ostensibly free market economic system, yet the state is the 
dominant actor through direct ownership or indirect influence (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 
2013; Lin & Milhaupt, 2013).  
In the interest of conceptual clarity, we make a simplifying assumption that each country 
operates under a single dominant corporate governance logic for all domestic firms or foreign 
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subsidiaries operating within a given national territory.  This boundary condition enables us to 
pursue a falsifiable middle range theory of governance deviance.  This assumption is 
conceptually supported by Besharov and Smith’s (2014) argument that all nations operate with a 
multiplicity of logics, but that there is always a single logic that dominates all others.  It is also 
empirically corroborated by Jones, Maoret, Massa, and Svejenova’s (2012) study of the rise of 
modern architecture, whereby firms adhere to a single national-level dominant logic to defend 
their modus operandi.  Of course, all organizations navigate within multiple governance logics to 
a certain extent (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010).  This is particularly true within 
the field of comparative corporate governance whereby foreign logics sometimes compete for 
dominance with the prevailing national logic (Djelic & Quack, 2010).  However, the nation-state 
remains the sovereign entity in today’s social order and this simplifying assumption enables us to 
focus on the interplay between a national dominant governance logic and firm agency in their 
selection of a particular governance practice.   
A dominant governance logic defines how firms are expected to conduct themselves if 
they seek to gain legitimacy through both their internal corporate governance practices (e.g., the 
role of the board, managerial incentives, and internal controls), and their responses to external 
governance mechanisms (e.g., the market for corporate control, media influence, and external 
auditing) (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015).  In sum, while we argue that firms 
generally conform to the dominant governance logic due to the considerable pressures to be 
perceived as legitimate (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), not all firms seek institutional legitimacy 
above all else (Oliver, 1991).  In the following section, we seek to explain why some firms 
deviate from the norms established by the dominant governance logic in which they are 
embedded.   
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The Intersection between Institutional Logics and Agentic Behavior 
 As suggested above, a classic challenge within organizational theory is to resolve the 
tension between institutional pressures and agentic behavior (DiMaggio, 1988).  The institutional 
logics perspective reasons that all agency, including organizational agency, starts with ‘situated 
awareness.’  Specifically, most organizations’ awareness is driven by top-down attentional 
processes whereby organizations largely conform to the prevailing institutional logic (Meyer & 
Scott, 1983).  In contrast, some organizations’ awareness is shaped by a combination of both top-
down and bottom-up attentional processes.  In the latter, more complex case, organizational 
agency is possible when the organization’s identity claims conflict with the prevailing logic 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).   
The Institutional Logics Perspective (ILP) proposes a framework composed of three 
stages leading towards organizational agency (Thornton et al., 2012).  In the first stage, when the 
organizational identity claims conflict with the prevailing logic, the organization becomes aware 
of alternative courses of action, and the potential for agency.  If the conflict between the 
organization’s identity and the prevailing logic is pronounced enough, in the second stage, the 
opportunity for organizational agency becomes enhanced, or what Thornton et al. (2012:92) refer 
to as being “readily accessible to attend to salient environmental stimuli” [emphasis added].  
However, accessibility does not guarantee the third stage, which is called activation.  ILP 
theorists attribute activation of the agentic behavior to situational misfit between the institutional 
logic and the nature of the organizational decision to be taken.  These three socio-cognitive 
stages help us unpack the dynamics behind organizational agency, and we elaborate on them in 
the remainder of this study. 
Although the ILP has provided valuable insights concerning when organizational agency 
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can occur for some organizations but not others within the same institutional context, it is fairly 
vague as to specifying how and when, the micro-foundations of cognition unfold within 
organizations.  There is also limited exploration about the socio-cognitive process of awareness, 
accessibility, and activation.  Thus,  most previous research examines conflicting coexisting 
institutional pressures within the institutional environment and treats the socio-cognitive 
processes operating within the firm as a “black box” (e.g.,; Joseph et al., 2014; Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2015; Navis & Glynn, 2010).  Hence, there is a need to refine ILP insights into 
explicit organizational processes, since organizational studies need deeper understanding of the 
specific antecedents of organizational practices (Greenwood et al., 2014). 
Relatedly, the actual catalyst of organizational agency is largely unspecified as 
organizational identity is a wide-ranging construct to which to attach organizational action 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985).  In this study, we also draw from the entrepreneurship literature in 
order to better explain and predict the adoption of governance practices that do not conform to 
prevailing norms and practices.  Specifically, we conceptualize the adoption of deviant corporate 
governance practices as an entrepreneurial act infused with meaning and expression of self-
identity.  
 
SOCIO-COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVIANCE 
 Based on the theoretical foundations articulated above, we are now properly positioned to 
lay out our theoretical model explaining corporate governance deviance.  Figure 1 graphically 
summarizes the combined institutional and organizational level factors central to our model.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Competing Forces for Meaning and Governance Discretion 
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We begin with the two dimensions that vie for a firm’s attention: (1) the top-down 
institutional logic which exerts pressures to conform in order to achieve social legitimacy, and 
(2) the bottom-up organizational values, meanings, and goals which interpret external pressures 
and weigh those imposed norms against a firm’s identity claims.  In essence, the identity claims 
of the dominant governance logic are in conflict with the organization’s identity.  For firms to 
resist institutional conformity pressures, they must first become aware of alternative practices 
and behaviors that do not conform to the prevailing logic.  In our context, we label this stage the 
governance practice awareness as shown in the bottom of Figure 1.   
Institutional research contends that awareness occurs through organizational identity 
claims, and it is well established that organizational identity is the primary filter by which a firm 
makes sense of and responds to institutional pressures (Kodeih & Greenwood, 2014).  According 
to Ashforth, Rogers, and Corley (2011), the organization’s identity and the institutional 
environment are reciprocally tied to each other, whereby firm-level identity claims either 
conform to or deviate from the prevailing institutional norms.   
Furthermore, Ashforth et al. (2011) astutely argue that institutional norms typically allow 
for some discretion, but this range of behavior has its limits.  With respect to corporate 
governance practices, Golden-Biddle and Rao (1997) observe that organizational identity drives 
perceptions and behavior within the boardroom where governance practices are deliberated and 
chosen.  Similarly, Canella, Jones, and Withers (2015) describe how family firms’ organizational 
identity greatly influences their governance choices.  In other words, identity conflicts between 
the prevailing logic and potential organizational practices are likely to trigger the consideration 
of alternative logics within the organization (Seo & Creed, 2002).   
 However, organizational identity is a rather broad construct and institutional research is 
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relatively silent as to which specific identity claims matter to make agentic behavior possible.  
The entrepreneurship literature is instructive here with its recent focus on entrepreneurial 
identity as an important sub-dimension of organizational identity which influences subsequent 
opportunity perceptions and guides entrepreneurial actions.  Navis and Glynn (2011: 480) define 
entrepreneurial identity as “the constellation of claims around the founders, organization, and 
market opportunity of an entrepreneurial entity [organization] that gives meaning to questions of 
‘who we are’ and ‘what we do’” and argue that “conformity to established standards is 
antithetical to entrepreneurship, which tends to be more concerned with novelty, distinctiveness, 
and nonconformity” (479).  They also note that firms vary in their awareness of the possibilities 
of digressing from established norms.   
In related work, Fauchart and Gruber (2011: 938), drawing on the theory of social 
cognition, demonstrate that entrepreneurs’ conceptions of their social selves (i.e., entrepreneurial 
identities) are “manifested in their social motivations, bases of self-evaluation, and views of the 
relevant social groups,” that, in turn, imprint organizational decision making.  Against the 
backdrop of this research, we argue that the centrality of an organization’s entrepreneurial 
identity as part of its overall organizational identity is the missing link in explaining the source of 
agentic behavior given isomorphic pressures.  
 The construct of entrepreneurial identity was originally developed in the context of 
individual founders and new entrepreneurial ventures.  Yet, we believe that it is a useful 
construct to apply to the overall organizational self-concept as it refines the specifics of 
organizational identity related to proactiveness and willingness to innovate and/or ignore 
prevailing norms.  Indeed, previous research repeatedly shows that social actors who either see 
themselves as excluded from the majority, or are confident enough to separate themselves from 
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others, are then most likely to avoid conforming to the status quo (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).  
As such, an organization’s entrepreneurial identity that is relatively central to the overall 
organizations identity makes it much more likely to take risks and/or have the confidence to 
pursue unproven ideas and practices (Navis & Glynn, 2011).   
In addition, we claim that entrepreneurial identity is applicable to all organizations that 
are early adopters of non-conforming practices.  As Miles and Snow (1978) cogently argue, 
every organization in existence must address its own unique entrepreneurial problem.  They 
show that even though Defender-type organizations are not known for their entrepreneurial 
instincts and practices, they still must develop an entrepreneurial identity consistent with the 
Defender lens to effectively address their entrepreneurial challenges.   
Of course, some firms possess multiple identities, with some identities being more 
central, or coherent, than others (Patvardhan, Gioia, & Hamilton, 2015).  Clearly, organizations 
whose entrepreneurial meaning of self-concept is more central to their organizational identity are 
more likely to found a new venture (Hoang & Gimeno, 2010).  As the firm becomes more 
established, its entrepreneurial identity is often challenged by other identities (Gioia, Patvardhan, 
Hamilton, & Corley, 2013).  Hence, the firm’s ability to maintain a highly centralized 
entrepreneurial identity is a key determinant of the adoption of new practices. 
In effect, some organizations, such as new entrepreneurial ventures, may have highly-
centralized entrepreneurial identities; while other organizations, such as highly-regulated and 
bureaucratic organizations, may possess relatively peripheral or nonexistent entrepreneurial 
identities (Haynie, Shepherd, Mosakowski, & Earley, 2010).  For example, Wright, Hoskisson, 
Busenitz, and Dial (2000) note that entrepreneurially-minded managers seeking to maintain the 
entrepreneurial identity of their firms will rely more extensively on heuristics and individual 
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beliefs, while managers who are less invested in the firm’s entrepreneurial identity typically 
depend on systematic decision-making that draws heavily on precedents established by other 
organizations.  In this regard, we would expect that the former are more likely to develop 
awareness of practices outside of the prevailing norms, while the latter are more likely to 
conform to the status quo.   
In addition, Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, and Sirmon (2009) argue that firms with more 
centralized entrepreneurial identities are relatively alert to new practices and opportunities, even 
if they are not perceived by outsiders to be legitimate with respect to existing institutional norms.  
Further, these researchers describe how the impetus for this opportunity recognition comes from 
the firm’s entrepreneurial drive to create more efficient and effective means and/or ends.  Once 
again, we observe that an organization’s entrepreneurial identity enables it to consider 
alternatives to established practices, even when those standard practices are perceived as under 
conforming to norms set by the institutional environment.   
 As depicted in Figure 1, the initial stage of awareness of the potential for adopting non-
conforming governance practices does not automatically lead to adoption because departure from 
established institutional norms can reduce a firm’s social legitimacy (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 
2008), and in turn, threaten its survival.  In sum, the firm’s entrepreneurial identity broadens its 
awareness of governance practices outside the prevailing governance logic and therefore expands 
the range of possibilities that the firm might consider; and all firms possess an entrepreneurial 
identity, but only a select few make that identity central to their organizational identity.   
Corporate Governance Discretion. We next draw on Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) construct of managerial discretion, which they conceptualize as the “theoretical bridge” 
between the firm’s external and internal constraints, coupled with its executives’ human agency.  
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We apply this construct to the comparative governance literature by proposing that although the 
prevailing governance logic prescribes certain governance practices as legitimate, thereby 
constraining the realm of legitimate governance practices, a firm’s entrepreneurial identity 
prompts the consideration of governance practices which exceed or fall below established 
legitimacy norms.  We argue that the prevailing governance logic and the firm’s entrepreneurial 
identity interact with each other to yield corporate governance discretion, which we define as 
the firm’s cognitive latitude of action to consider the adoption of a deviant governance practice.  
In other words, governance discretion is a set of possible governance practices that are 
contemplated, some within and others outside the zone of conformity, as specified by the 
prevailing governance logic.   
In sum, governance discretion is the by-product of two different forces.  On the one hand, 
agentic organizational characteristics such as experience, scanning, and insight can expand 
discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: 373), which we argue emanates from the firm’s 
entrepreneurial identity.  On the other hand, the normative context delineates the legitimate range 
of behaviors as specified by the prevailing governance logic.  Indeed, Phillips & Zuckerman 
(2001) show how the notion that “context matters” is an important new insight advanced to help 
us better understand social conformity dynamics.  Thus, a firm’s entrepreneurial identity offers a 
catalyst for becoming more aware of a broader set of governance practices beyond those that are 
legitimated by the prevailing governance logic.  As Pache and Santos (2013) argue that in the 
absence of awareness, accessibility is not even an option for a firm.  In light of these arguments, 
we propose: 
Proposition 1: The more central a firm’s entrepreneurial identity is to its overall 
organizational identity, the greater will be its corporate governance discretion to 
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consider non-conforming practices with respect to a dominant governance logic.  
From Governance Discretion to Governance Deviance 
Governance discretion provides the set of potential actions which are accessible as 
cognitive choices driven by a firm’s entrepreneurial identity, and will determine whether a firm 
is likely to follow inertial versus strategic choices when evaluating governance practices.  Yet, 
the accessibility of alternative governance practices will not automatically determine the 
activation or adoption of new governance practices outside the existing logic.  However, 
governance discretion will make actual deviance much more likely.   
Organizational research recognizes that managers have discretion, but that they are also 
confined by institutional pressures and legitimacy norms.  For example, Hambrick and 
Finkelstein state that “a manager’s discretion has no rigid bounds: it is limited in part by his or 
her own awareness and repertoire, as well as by constraints that are largely unstated and untested 
rather than explicit” (1987: 371).  Deephouse (1999) discusses this interplay between discretion 
and legitimacy in his thesis that “firms seeking competitive advantage should be as different as 
legitimately possible” [italics added] (p. 148).  Similarly, Crossland and Hambrick (2007, 2011) 
illustrate the role of national-level institutions in demarcating managerial discretion and assume 
that boundaries on managerial actions mostly conform to the prevailing logic.   
In this study, we challenge this automatic conformity assumption and extend the 
construct of governance discretion to include non-conforming practices.  In particular, we argue 
that organizations might adopt corporate governance practices that fall outside the zone of 
conformity prescribed by the prevailing governance logic.  We identify these non-conforming 
governance practices adopted outside the zone of conformity as deviant governance practices.  
A certain degree of governance discretion is a necessary cognitive condition for an 
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organization to adopt a deviant governance practice.  In order for governance deviance to be 
activated, a firm must first experience cognitive dissonance between the prevailing governance 
logic and the firm’s entrepreneurial identity and goals.  Therefore, governance deviance 
activation is only possible when organizations do not slavishly adhere to a particular logic 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014).  In effect, as governance discretion increases, a firm becomes more 
likely to activate an alternative and accessible governance logic or the combination of the 
existing logic with goals and schemas outside the established zone of conformity (Seo & Creed, 
2002).   
The activation of governance deviance is possible because firms can cognitively envision 
a future that challenges the prevailing governance logic (Thornton et al., 2012) due to 
incongruence with their intrinsic entrepreneurial identity and the awareness of other available 
and accessible practices.  Supporting this argument, Cho and Hambrick (2006) show in the 
airline deregulation context that firms with a more entrepreneurial attentional perspective are 
more likely to activate other strategies that they have become aware of, even when these choices 
may be less accessible (non-conforming).  Likewise, Glynn (2000) demonstrates how a 
symphony orchestra can shift from the most accessible aesthetic logic to a blend of “also present 
but less accessible” market logic driven by commercial motives.  The key issue here is that the 
entrepreneurial identity needs to be salient enough to provide awareness of the opportunity and 
increase the likelihood that a firm considers a source of action beyond the zone of conformity.  
Thus, greater governance discretion makes accessible a wider range of governance choices, and 
increases the likelihood to adopt deviant governance practices.  
An illustration of how governance discretion enables governance deviance within the 
shareholder-oriented dominant logic is the American supermarket chain, Whole Foods.  This 
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iconic firm has a long corporate history of envisioning relatively high governance discretion in 
compensation practices, often in the name of “conscious capitalism.”  Even though Whole Foods 
is embedded in a shareholder-oriented governance logic, its compensation practices are much 
more aligned with the stakeholder governance logic.  For example, we would argue that a 
deviant governance practice, such as capping of the co-CEOs’ salaries at 19 times the average 
employee salary (Rubin, 2010), is triggered by its entrepreneurial identity to be relatively open to 
deviate, which leads to the accessibility of different practices, and expands its governance 
discretion.   
Conversely, in the context of the statist governance logic, there is the example one of 
China’s largest banks, Agricultural Bank of China, known for its distinct entrepreneurial identity 
based on new technologies (Bloomberg, 2014). This state-owned bank reports remarkably low 
executive salaries, even by Chinese compensation standards.  We posit that it possesses the 
governance discretion to consider compensation practices that fall outside the prevailing logic’s 
zone of conformity, and is thus more likely to adopt deviant practices.  In light of these 
arguments and illustrations, we propose, 
Proposition 2: The greater the corporate governance discretion, the more likely a firm 
will be to adopt a deviant governance practice within a dominant governance logic.  
We now turn to two key contingencies that are predicted to moderate the governance 
discretion-governance deviance relationship.  The first moderator, regulatory enforcement, works 
at the country-level and it is expected to be an important modifier of governance logic.  The 
second moderator, governance capacity, operates at the firm level and it seeks to evaluate the 
ability to implement, beyond the cognitive latitude and accessibility of the opportunity.  Figure 1 
illustrates these two contingencies.  
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The Contingent Influence of Extent of Regulatory Enforcement 
Regulatory enforcement is an essential institutional dimension that influences all economic 
exchanges and can vary substantially from economy to economy (North, 1990).  Although 
previous comparative corporate governance research has traditionally focused on the influence of 
the type of legal system (La Porta et al., 2000), more recent studies note that the extent of 
regulatory enforcement may be a more important determinant of corporate behavior.  We follow 
Banerjee (2011: 161) in defining the extent of regulatory enforcement as the degree to which 
government monitoring is consistent, and the severity of punishment for violating rules and laws 
is predictable.   
Pache and Santos (2010) identify regulatory authorities as a key contextual contingency 
which can coerce organizations to behave in a certain way due to their legal power, and thus 
affect a firm’s compliance or non-compliance with socially-desirable practices.  The extent of 
regulatory enforcement matters because it varies across countries, while the de jure content of 
national laws tends to be more homogenous (Malik, 2014).  Since corporations are legally 
sanctioned by the state, the regulatory environment represents a critical set of institutional 
pressures which create accountability standards and enforce legitimacy norms for organizational 
practices (Edelman & Stryker, 2005), and consequently should influence the firm’s adoption of 
deviant corporate governance practices.  
When firms have access to a wider array of governance practices (i.e., greater corporate 
governance discretion), their chosen governance practice is still likely to be contingent on how 
strict and “rule-like” the regulatory enforcement is.  Consequently, a firm might be interested in 
adopting a novel governance practice leading to deviance from the national governance logic; 
however, the regulatory sanctions may be extensive, predictable, and costly if the adopted 
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governance practice falls outside the zone of conformity.  In contrast, a looser enforcement of 
governance regulation might provide fuzzier normative pressure, weak coercive power, or no 
consequences whatsoever for a firm that is aware of and considering the adoption of an 
accessible deviant governance practice.  
 The extent of regulatory enforcement is shaped by political (Roe, 2003) and cultural 
(Licht, 2017) institutions, and it varies across the four distinct governance logics.  In economies 
where shareholder-oriented governance logic prevails, corporate governance regulation is 
typically explicit, and the coercive sanctions for violating regulations are precise (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2000).  This “hard law” governance regulation is usually strictly and predictably 
enforced, with severe sanctions to transgressors (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2000).  
However, in social rights economies following a stakeholder-oriented governance logic, 
corporate governance regulation allows for more variation through “soft law” such as codes of 
good governance which are non-binding (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004), normatively 
enforced, and coordination among affected  parties is encouraged (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  
Societal normative pressures are more salient and a wider compliance variation is negotiated.  
Finally, there are economies where the governance rules and regulations exist, but quasi-legal 
and illegal transgressions are idiosyncratically addressed outside coercive or normative 
regulatory mechanisms.  Such a situation is often found in economies dominated by relational 
and statist governance logics.  Economies in this context can be described as “limited law” 
regulatory environments (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).  
To properly identify our theoretical model of corporate governance deviance, as shown in 
Figure 1, we incorporate the extent of regulatory enforcement by looking at the influence of three 
regulatory types found in the four logics: hard law’s strict regulatory enforcement, soft law’s 
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flexible regulatory enforcement, and limited law’s lax regulatory enforcement.  We expect that in 
firms operating in economies operating with a hard law approach, it is more difficult to not 
comply with the relatively explicit and consistently applied normative standards.   
In contrast, the soft law regulatory environment accounts for the adoption of practices 
outside the zone of conformity and the law deliberately permits a range of acceptable practices 
and does not prescribe a rigid set of practices.  For example, as Cioffi (2010: 81) states: “In 
contrast with the litigation-prone American model, the German corporate governance regime 
factored negotiation within the institutional framework of the corporation rather than 
enforcement of rights through adjudication.”  Thus, in this case, the stakeholder-oriented 
governance logic allows practices outside the zone of conformity, but these would be categorized 
as not complying with norms.   
In the context of relatively lax regulatory enforcement which can be characterized as one 
where regulatory voids are common and standards are obtuse, there is a highly constrained or 
non-existent will to prosecute and implement sanctions in a consistent fashion (Jackson, 2007).  
Put plainly, firms operating in such a governance environment might easily consider the adoption 
of a governance practice incongruent with existing rules and laws and they are unlikely to be 
inhibited or even stopped by the law due to its weak enforcement.   
Illustrating these differences in the context of regulation regarding disclosure of 
executive compensation, the United States’ shareholder-oriented governance logic is prescriptive 
and explicit as to how executive compensation should be disclosed — all listed firms must abide 
by those regulations or they will suffer swift and extensive financial penalties (Securities & 
Exchange Commission, 2015).  As a result, firms are less likely to deviate from compensation 
disclosure regulations within this governance environment.  In contrast, since 2010, Brazil’s 
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economy operates within a limited law regulatory environment which requires all publicly-listed 
firms to disclose the compensation of top executives and board members, but more than one-
quarter of the firms ignore this disclosure requirement (Barros, da Silveira, Bortolon, & Leal, 
2015).  In sum, even if a firm has a reasonably wide governance discretion with an interest in 
adopting a deviant governance practice, it will be less likely to adopt that practice if the 
country’s regulatory enforcement is explicit and coercive rather than flexible or limited. Hence, 
we propose:  
Proposition 3: The extent of regulatory enforcement negatively moderates the 
corporate governance discretion-governance deviance relationship within a 
dominant governance logic.   
The Contingent Influence of the Corporate Governance Capacity 
 The entrepreneurship literature argues that all value-creating entrepreneurial activity first 
requires the ability to recognize an opportunity and then to exploit that opportunity (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2005).  This is consistent with the ILP whereby all deviation begins with awareness 
created by identity claims leading to accessibility and then activation.  However, in order for the 
entrepreneurially-oriented firm to actually exploit an opportunity, or transition from accessibility 
to activation, its chances of exerting agency are greatly enhanced by possessing or having access 
to the necessary tangible and intangible resources or “capital” to do so (Brush, Greene, & Hart, 
2001).  
Some firms, particularly mature ones, have an extensive capacity to deviate from 
established norms and practices if they so choose.  For example, Zahra (1996) demonstrates that 
both financial liquidity and long-term institutional ownership levels within established firms are 
positively associated with corporate entrepreneurship in developed economies.  Similarly, 
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Filatotchev, Wright, Buck, and Dyomina (1999) report that firms in transition countries which 
possess the necessary financial, human, and social capacity to restructure the enterprise tend to 
be more responsive to market pressures, and are rewarded in the global economy when they act 
more entrepreneurially.   
Other firms, particularly startup enterprises, tend to work with very limited capacity, 
often due to financial capacity constraints (Brush et al., 2001).  For example, Baker and Nelson 
(2005) observe that individual entrepreneurs might discover new opportunities, but lack the 
appropriate financial capacity to pursue that opportunity.  In sum, the entrepreneurship literature 
clearly asserts that entrepreneurial behavior requires more than just the socio-cognitive 
awareness and recognition of an opportunity; it also necessitates a sufficient portfolio of 
resources to pursue that opportunity (Smith, Judge, Pezeshkan & Nair, in press).  
While the entrepreneurship literature traditionally focuses on the creation of new goods 
and services, the same may be true with respect to the adoption of new corporate governance 
practices that may deviate from established practices.  We refer to this important capability as the 
firm’s governance capacity, and we define it as the aggregate financial, human, social, and moral 
capital available to a firm to intentionally adopt deviant governance practices.  As shown in 
Figure 1, we expect that corporate governance capacity moderates the governance discretion-
governance deviance relationship by enabling or constraining the firm in its socio-cognitive 
activation process surrounding deviant behavior.   
As suggested by our definition above, a firm’s governance capacity may draw upon many 
different forms of capital.  At its most basic level, the firm must possess the necessary financial 
capital to invest in a governance practice which is different from the prevailing governance logic, 
since this form of capital reduces the organization’s dependence on the external environment, 
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and enables the board of directors to pursue alternative courses of action (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003).  In addition, the firm must also possess the necessary human and social capital to act 
differently from others in its environment, particularly within the boardroom (Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010).  For example, Fortune 500 firms are often predominantly owned by institutional 
investors.  If a firm wants to deviate from established norms and practices, its board and 
executive team must effectively leverage their collective human and social capital with their 
institutional investors to do so (Zahra, 1996).  Finally, the firm must possess the moral capital to 
provide the capacity to deviate from established norms even when such practices are viewed as 
excessively focused on the common good (Godfrey, 2005) or immoral (Webb et al., 2009).   
In order to illustrate the moderating role of governance capacity on the adoption of 
compensation practices that deviate from the prevailing governance logic, we turn our attention 
to Volkswagen (VW), Europe’s largest car manufacturer.  VW is headquartered in Germany, an 
economy dominated by a stakeholder-oriented governance logic.  In 2012, VW CEO Martin 
Winterkorn’s pay nearly doubled to 23 million euros as he became the highest paid CEO in 
Germany’s top 30 DAX-listed companies (Rogers, 2012), clearly incongruent with the country’s 
governance norms which aspire to equity for all and modest compensation premiums relative to 
employees.  VW certainly has extensive financial and human capital to compensate its CEO 
above German standards (Forbes, 2015), yet local reporters, seemingly shocked by Winterkorn’s 
compensation, peppered him with questions, asking if auto executives are becoming “the new 
bankers when it comes to pay” (Rogers, 2012: 3).  Remarkably, Winterkorn resigned from VW 
on September 23, 2015 due to the diesel emissions scandal, but is still expected to receive over 
$66 million in severance compensation (Boston, 2015).  In this example, VW possessed the 
governance discretion to activate a practice outside of the governance logic’s zone of conformity, 
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which was facilitated by the organizational governance capacity to support it.  In sum, we 
propose: 
Proposition 4: The extent of corporate governance capacity positively moderates 
the corporate governance discretion-governance deviance relationship within a 
dominant governance logic. 
A NEW TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVIANCE 
Recall that corporate governance deviance is a nonconforming behavior relative to the 
zone of conformity defined by the dominant national governance logic.  It is triggered by the 
salience of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity to proactively explore new ideas, and is influenced 
by the extent of cognitively accessible governance discretion.  To deepen our understanding of 
governance deviance, it is critical to return to our point of departure where a firm’s 
entrepreneurial identity drives its awareness of opportunities, provides access to potentially 
deviant practices, and ultimately makes it more likely to adopt a non-conforming practice. 
In this section, we propose a typology of corporate governance deviance summarized in 
Table 1.  We are guided by two key conceptual dimensions: (1) entrepreneurial motives 
emanating from inside the firm (Wry & York, in press), and (2) normative expectations 
emanating from outside the firm (Heckert & Heckert, 2002).  Related to our first dimension, 
existing research identifies two main motives of entrepreneurial activities which are commercial 
and social motivations.  Commercially-motivated entrepreneurial organizations focus their 
attention and meaning on creating economic value, and socially-motivated entrepreneurial 
organizations emphasize the creation of social value (Miller, Grimes, McMullen, & Vogus, 
2012).  These two entrepreneurial motives are conceptualized along a continuum, and can be 
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present in nonprofit, for-profit, or governmental sectors.  For purposes of explication, we discuss 
each end of the continuum as two distinct categories of entrepreneurial motives.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Research on organizational identity and entrepreneurship explains how founders and their 
firms’ entrepreneurial identities define and shape entrepreneurial motives.  Most notably, 
Fauchart and Gruber (2011) argue that entrepreneurial motives emerge from the entrepreneurial 
identity of the firm and demonstrate that commercial entrepreneurial motives emanate from a 
darwinian entrepreneurial identity focused on economic self-interest, professionalism, and being 
a competitor; while social entrepreneurial motives are driven by communitarian and missionary 
entrepreneurial identities focused on to the community, positively affecting others’ well-being, 
and defining themselves as authentic and responsible contributors.  Organizational motivations to 
pursue social entrepreneurship reflect an underlying identity of compassion in terms of 
prioritizing well-being beyond materialistic concerns, and feeling an emotional connection to 
others who suffer (Miller et al., 2012).  
Relative to the second dimension related to normative expectations, Heckert and Heckert 
(2002) expand on the notion that deviant behavior can under- or over-conform to prevailing 
social norms by considering the normative context of the institutional environment.  Recent work 
draws upon these insights to build a model of the likely distribution of social approval loss 
following a crisis (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015).  Others rely on Heckert and Heckert (2002) to argue 
that both over- and under-conforming firm behaviors sometimes lead to “firm celebrity” because 
they violate the prevailing social norms, but not enough to become “outlaws” (Rindova et al., 
2006).  This normative distinction of over- and under-conformity is critical to our proposed 
typology, given our interest in governance deviance.  
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Consequently, we continue our focus on embedded agency within an institutional context 
by developing a new typology based on entrepreneurial motives and normative expectations.  In 
so doing, we advance four distinct types of corporate governance deviance which we label: (1) 
Commercial Mavericks, (2) Social Rebels, (3) Commercial Rate-Busters, and (4) Social Angels.  
Due to the abstractness of the following argument, we provide anecdotal illustrations.  Thus, we 
discuss the application of our typology through the governance practice of CEO compensation 
across two of the four distinct governance logics (i.e., stakeholder and relational) and include 
illustrative company examples in each case.  Differences in compensation practices are highly 
embedded in national institutions of social power structures and income stratification 
(Greckhamer, 2016) which we have conceptualized as governance logic.   
It is important to first explain how these two governance logics define the legitimate 
compensation practices within the zone of conformity before we turn our attention to the 
governance deviance types.  We selected Brazil, with its relational governance logic, and 
Germany, with its stakeholder governance logic, for illustration purposes in order to demonstrate 
that governance deviance is always evaluated in light of a specific prevailing governance logic.  
Compared to U.S. and U.K. firms, Brazilian firms pay higher CEO compensation relative to 
other workers (Economist, 2011).  This governance logic seeks to attract and retain top talent and 
to deter corruption, and is consistent with the socio-cultural history of Brazil (Menezes-Filho, 
Muendler, & Ramey, 2008).  Therefore, under this scenario, an under-conforming compensation 
practice for a Brazilian firm is to pay relatively low salaries to CEOs relative to others; and an 
over-conforming practice is to pay exorbitantly high salaries, even by Brazilian standards.   
Conversely, German firms are expected to adhere to moderate CEO compensation 
practices relative to other workers (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004).  Hence, a German compensation 
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practice under-conforming to the stakeholder-governance logic grants relatively high CEO 
salaries, while over-conforming practices result in substantially lower CEO salaries.  
Interestingly, identical CEO compensation practices receive different normative evaluations 
relative to the zone of conformity, depending on the dominant legitimate governance logic.  
Next, we discuss each of the cells in Table 1 summarizing our proposed typology.  All cells 
include firms with highly central entrepreneurial identities that have chosen to adopt practices 
outside the zone of conformity, and are therefore engaging in governance deviance.  
Cell 1 of Table 1, which we label Commercial Mavericks, refers to under-conforming 
governance practices that are driven primarily by commercial entrepreneurial motivations within 
a firm.  For example, Petrobras, a large state-owned Brazilian oil company, employs extremely 
entrepreneurial and commercially-motivated professionals as evidenced by its cutting-edge and 
competitive technological prowess in drilling oil in ultra-deepwater, pre-salt wells (Guardian, 
2015).  This organization’s entrepreneurial identity would fall into the darwinian type specified 
by Fauchart and Gruber (2011).  Yet, the salaries of Petrobras’ politically-connected executives 
and CEO are relatively low, therefore under-conforming with the Brazilian governance norms.  
Turning to an example within the stakeholder-oriented governance logic, the under-
conforming CEO compensation practice by a firm with high entrepreneurial identity is also 
displayed by Deutsche Bank where the two co-CEOs were among the most highly compensated 
European-based bank CEOs, and certainly amongst all firms within Germany (Financial Times, 
2015).  Deutsche Bank’s general disposition towards a commercially-motivated entrepreneurship 
is evident in the statement from the opening paragraph of its most recent annual report: “It is in 
the nature of entrepreneurialism to sometimes act against conventional opinions” (Deutsche 
Bank, 2015: 11).   
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The Cell 2 deviant governance type, or what we call Social Rebels, is characterized by 
entrepreneurial firms primarily motivated by social goals, yet whose practices under-conform to 
the prevailing governance logic.  In other words, they are “rebels with a cause” (Jones et al., 
2012).  For example, the Brazilian financial service firm Sitawi focuses on social welfare 
motives and pays comparatively low salaries to CEO Leonardo Letelier (Letelier, 2012).  In 
contrast, SAP’s CEO, Bill McDermott, is the third most-highly paid CEO in Germany (Finanzen, 
2015).  However, SAP appears to fit the Rebel type due to its socially-motivated entrepreneurial 
motivation as reflected by its mission statement: “To help the world run better and improve 
people’s lives” (SAP, 2015: 1).   
The third type of deviant governance practice, called Commercial Rate-Busters (cell 3), is 
characterized by over-conformity to the dominant governance logic while primarily seeking 
commercial goals.  This type is illustrated by Brazilian firm, Vale, the world’s third largest 
mining company whose CEO receives extremely high compensation, even by Brazilian standards 
(Torres, 2012).  Vale’s commercial motivation is evident in the statement “Our main goal is to 
maximize shareholder value” and its stock was the second most highly traded equity listing on 
the NYSE in 2014 (Vale, 2015:1).   
In Germany, over-conforming governance deviance practices entail paying relatively low 
CEO salaries, while pursuing commercial interests above all else.  One illustration is the German 
discount supermarket chain, Lidl, which prioritizes company market principles of customer 
satisfaction and value for money above all else (Lidl, 2015:1).  Notably, Lidl’s CEO’s 
compensation is in the bottom quarter of the industry, and this compensation is lower than what 
would be expected given German norms (Businessweek, 2015).  This is also an example of what 
Heckert and Heckert (2002) refer as “rate busting” type of deviance.   
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Our last governance deviance type, Social Angels (cell 4), occurs when the governance 
practice over-conforms with the dominant governance logic and is entrepreneurially motivated 
by underlying social aims.  A good example of this deviance type in the context of relational 
governance logic is Natura Cosmeticos, a Brazilian firm which makes beauty, household, and 
personal care products and prioritizes human rights and environmental sustainability in all of its 
markets.  Notably, CEO Roberto Oliveira de Lima receives a high to moderate salary of US$1.5 
million relative to the average Sao Paolo, Brazil-based CEO who earns about US$620k 
(Economist, 2011).  Natura Cosmeticos’s CEO salary over-conforms to the Brazilian 
compensation practices, yet it is driven by social welfare concerns.   
Conversely, in Germany, over-conforming compensation practices occur when a firm 
with a “missionary” identity (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011) pays relatively low salaries.  One 
example is Gesundkostwerk Deutschland, a German firm which produces and distributes 
vegetarian and dairy foods.  The firm’s long-standing commitment to social well-being began 
with its unusual inception in 1899 during a reform movement in the industrial period to improve 
living standards by producing healthy nutrition.  Gesundkostwerk’s over-conformance with 
compensation practices and social motivations are evident in CEO Michael Berghorn’s relative 
low salary (Money House, 2015).   
 In sum, these four types of governance deviance illustrate that the national governance 
context “sets the stage” to define the normative expectations, but the firm’s entrepreneurial 
motivations enables the firm to improvise in its performance.  This typology breaks new 
theoretical ground by refining and extending the ILP and the entrepreneurship literatures, and it 
yields exciting new research opportunities for the corporate governance scholars.   
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DISCUSSION 
With the rise of emerging markets and the interconnected financial flows in the global 
economy, the international corporate governance literature is at a crossroads.  Djelic and Quack’s 
(2010) call to incorporate comparative perspectives with many countries is, as they admit, both 
conceptually and empirically hard to pursue.  Some scholars argue for probing the limits of 
“universal” context-free theories in emerging economies to better understand these theories’ 
limits; others push for the development of “indigenous” theories that are independent of any 
extant theory (Jack, Zhu, Barney, Brannen, Prichard, Singh, & Whetten, 2012).   
We believe that neither a universal nor an indigenous approach is likely to be productive.  
Instead, the development of context-sensitive middle range theories is useful to better understand 
how and why organizations operate within certain boundary conditions across national 
governance systems.  In effect, middle range theorizing blends the virtues of the universal with 
the indigenous approach, and permits empirical testing which leads to accumulation of new 
insights over time (Merton, 1968: 39).  Thus, we argue that the field of comparative corporate 
governance needs more middle-range theorizing that explores delimited aspects of governance 
phenomena and permits empirical testing.   
Future Research 
For any new theoretical development, the first order of business is to empirically test the 
proposed model and ascertain its utility and falsifiability.  Clearly, there is a need to extensively 
test our fundamental premise that the centrality of the firm’s entrepreneurial identity within the 
context of a dominant governance logic is the primary driver for the adoption of deviant 
corporate governance practices.  We illustrate the validity of our framework throughout this 
study by sharing numerous examples of the adoption of deviant CEO compensation practices.  
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However, our framework can be productively applied to other pressing governance issues such 
as explanations for diverse compositions of boards, anomalous corporate political activity, 
unusual firm-level responses to climate change initiatives, and cybersecurity experiments.  Of 
course, for some governance practices such as moral leadership or community engagement, it 
might be more difficult to pinpoint what practices fall within the zone of conformity.  Future 
research should also examine the possibility that a deviant practice can eventually turn into a 
legitimate one, setting new governance standards.  Indeed, it is likely that this bottom-up 
deviation process is the source of all institutional entrepreneurship (Greenwood, et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, theoretical understanding can also progress by exploring the primary 
boundary condition specified in this study.  Recall that the boundary condition that we imposed 
on our model is the simplifying assumption that there is one dominant governance logic 
operating within each national economy.  When this boundary condition is relaxed, we are faced 
with the potential existence of multiple institutional logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; 
Greenwood et al., 2011).  This theoretical relaxation introduces three complexities to our 
proposed model, and further investigation could be very illuminating.   
The first complexity acknowledges the possibility of the co-existence of roughly 
equivalent, yet competing governance logics external to the firm within the same national 
economy (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010).  For example, in the 
United States, with its shareholder-oriented governance logic, Lee and Lousnsbury (2015) show 
that environmental practices in some communities are perceived as legitimate, but the exact same 
practices are considered illegitimate in other communities.  Moreover, U.S. firms buffered from 
takeover-disciplining pressures might be encouraged, within the shareholder-oriented 
governance logic, to shift to a stakeholder governance logic in the absence of such external 
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pressures (Kacperczyk, 2009).  Different owners might also adhere to different logics as 
indicated by Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, and Hitt’s (2010) comparison of governance practices 
between “dedicated” versus “transient” institutional investors.  These studies show that the co-
existence of functionally equivalent, but distinct governance logics can influence governance 
practices, and it would be a natural next step to examine the impact of such a condition after 
testing our middle range theory.  
The second complexity associated with the existence of multiple logics is the potential 
emergence of an alternative governance logic that may challenge the dominance of a prevailing 
governance logic.  Even though logics are fairly “sticky,” they are not static (Aguilera, 
Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008).  Notably, Colyvas and Maroulis (2015) argue that 
institutions emerge from a bottom-up experimental process whereby innovative early adopters 
meet with success and others imitate their approach.  It may be that firm-level governance 
deviance practices can lead to a governance logic that competes with or even replaces the 
existing governance logic if a critical mass of firms emulate one firm’s deviant governance 
practices.  For example, Webb et al. (2009) note that non-conforming entrepreneurial practices in 
the informal economy sometimes become institutionalized within the formal economy, even 
when those same practices were initially viewed as semi-legal or even illegal.  As such, studying 
how deviant governance practices lead to institutional entrepreneurship could be a fruitful area of 
future research.   
A third complexity posed by the relaxation of our boundary condition points to the 
possibility that firms may become aware of different corporate governance practices through 
their exposure to governance logics outside the realm of their domestic institutional environment.  
For example, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006: 9) argue that “[T]ransnational regulation is a 
  35 
 
mode of governance in the sense that it structures, guides, and controls human and social 
activities and interactions beyond, across, and within national territories.”  In our interconnected 
age, all firms have potential awareness of, and accessibility to, governance practices outside their 
national domain, which can challenge the prevailing national governance logic.  This is 
particularly true if a firm possesses a highly centralized entrepreneurial identity.   
Thus, even though firms experience pressures to conform to the national governance 
logic, they might have to modify some of their governance practices when they navigate across 
multiple governance logics.  For example, domestic firms might attract foreign owners or private 
equity who demand different governance practices, choose to list on a foreign stock market with 
more stringent governance requirements, seek to comply with governance hyper-norms defined 
by international governance watchdogs, or decide to remove themselves from the pressures of 
their current governance logic by incorporating in another country with different governance 
requirements.  Notably, the recognition of different governance logics might trump the current 
prevailing national governance logic and may trigger governance deviance if the firm possesses a 
sufficiently central entrepreneurial identity.  Future research could develop this under-theorized 
area, for example, by exploring the process of transnational pressures on firms, including the 
legitimacy bestowed by the general public (Haack, Pfarrer, & Scherer, 2014) or in the case of 
corporate governance, the transnational pressures to conform to a single, international accounting 
standard (Judge, Li, & Pinsker, 2010). 
While previous research repeatedly shows that home country institutions often maintain a 
firm grip on multinational firm behavior, these global firms could be another fruitful context to 
test and expand our theory of governance deviance.  Multinational firms can easily engage in 
governance arbitrage—that is, they can pick and choose the governance logic that best suits the 
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enterprise identity at a given time.  One of the challenges confronting these geographically-
dispersed firms, as described by Kostova, Roth, and Dacin (2008), is the common experience of 
dealing with conflicting governance logics across the different countries in which the 
multinationals operate.  Recent research reveals that geographic dispersion can be both a 
challenge and an opportunity.  For example, Geng, Yoshikawa, and Colpan (2016) empirically 
show that some firms in Japan with fairly centralized entrepreneurial orientation seek to adhere 
to a shareholder-oriented logic by adopting stock option pay compensation agreements, despite 
deviance from the prevailing stakeholder-oriented logic.  Future research could help us to better 
understand how multinational firms pursue distinctive governance practices and how 
transnational pressures shape these decisions.  However, we first need to explore the interplay 
between the firm’s entrepreneurial identity and its prevailing governance logic before tackling 
these complexities and refinements.   
Implications for Theory  
Implications for comparative corporate governance.  The corporate governance 
literature has begun to explore the remarkably strong influence of national institutions on 
corporate governance practices and outcomes (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010), particularly in 
developed economies.  However, this literature has not yet systematically and comprehensively 
identified the salient governance logics operating within the global economy.  This study 
provides a roadmap for understanding corporate governance practices operating across the global 
economy by identifying four diverse types of governance logics.  In addition, comparative 
corporate governance research often fails to explain why corporate governance practices vary 
within a national governance environment (García-Castro, Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013), and this 
study advances a theoretical framework for explaining why this might happen. 
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Overall, our multi-level focus merging macro and micro explanations should enable 
future researchers to consider not only the national institutional context, but also firm-level 
antecedents to describe and explain governance behaviors and outcomes.  In addition, the notion 
of governance deviance that over- or under-conforms with prevailing governance standards 
poses new and interesting possibilities for future research related to how different forms of 
deviance affect other firm outcomes.  Finally, the central goal of all economies is to generate 
wealth equitably (Judge, Fainshmidt & Brown, 2014).  Our introduction of moral capital within 
the governance capacity construct and entrepreneurial motives grounded in social welfare 
concerns opens up new areas of study for understanding how firms address social equity 
concerns which are internally motivated.   
Implications for the institutional logic perspective.  Recent developments in 
institutional theory offer powerful new insights into how organizations exercise agency within an 
embedded context (Greenwood et al., 2011).  In particular, the institutional logics perspective 
argues that the micro-foundations of organizational agency stem from firm identity 
categorization (Thornton et al., 2012: 92).  Unfortunately, this rather broad “meta-theory” fails to 
identify what type of organizational identities matter; nor does it tell us exactly how the construct 
of identity interacts with external institutional pressures to yield varying organizational practices 
and outcomes across countries.  In this study, we highlight the central role of entrepreneurial 
identity as the primary source of organizational agency and intentionality with respect to 
corporate governance practices which do not conform to the prevailing governance logic.  By 
combining insights from the institutional logics perspective with the entrepreneurship literature, 
we begin to explore the micro-foundations of embedded agency for corporate governance 
practices.   
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Previous institutional logics literature highlights the role of attention by the 
organization’s dominant coalition, but it is fairly vague with respect to the specific causal 
mechanisms of organizational agency.  For example, Joseph et al. (2014) claim that path-
dependent rules guide board decision making, but they do not specify how this relates to identity 
claims.  Also, Terlaak (2007) argues that the dominant coalition makes cost-benefit calculations 
as to when the organization should resist prevailing institutional logics, but does not elaborate as 
to how these calculations are made.  While these insights are clearly important, we believe that 
the specific construct that triggers the deviation response is missing from this perspective.  In 
sum, we assert that the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity is the missing link in 
explaining when and how organization’s deviate from isomorphic pressures.  
Implications for the entrepreneurship literature.  Entrepreneurship at its core involves 
the discovery and pursuit of new opportunities (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000).  However, the 
entrepreneur as well as the entrepreneurially-oriented firm is embedded within an institutional 
context (Dencker & Gruber, 2015; Terjesen, Hessels, & Li, 2016), and no cross-national 
entrepreneurship literature that we are aware of has yet provided a coherent framework for 
specifying why and when an organization will resist institutional pressures and deviate from 
established norms in terms of governance practices.  Entrepreneurs often choose to not conform 
to the prevailing practices, and we assert that it is the centrality of the firm’s entrepreneurial 
identity that enables firms to adopt deviant governance practices.  Consequently, understanding 
how an entrepreneurial identity is created and maintained within an organizational and 
institutional context is essential for moving this literature forward.   
Related to the notion of entrepreneurial identity, our typology also considers the 
entrepreneurial motives behind the adoption of deviant governance practices.  Building on Wry 
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and York’s (press), we distinguish between commercial and social motives as manifestations of 
entrepreneurial identity, which in turn per our model will influence governance deviance.  Most 
entrepreneurship research is focused on how to manage and govern the firm to help ensure that it 
is more innovative in the marketplace (Drucker, 1985).  In this study, we flip this logic and 
explore how a firm’s entrepreneurial tendencies might influence its governance choices.   
Implications for Practice 
Our research also contains practical implications for strategic leaders seeking to navigate 
the conflicting pressures that they experience in their effort to achieve a distinctive competency.  
We can easily imagine that a firm with a relatively pronounced entrepreneurial identity early in 
its life cycle might experience considerable conflict later on as other identities vie for supremacy 
within the firm.  Indeed, it has long been recognized that many firms lose their entrepreneurial 
“spirit” or identity as it evolves over time (Haveman, Habinek, & Goodman, 2012), and our 
model offers yet another reason to resist this trend. 
 Of course, all governance practices are ultimately chosen by the firm’s board of directors.  
While it remains to be seen how deviant governance practices influence the firm’s prospects for 
long-term survival, our study suggests that directors should not dogmatically adopt only 
governance practices that are prescribed by the dominant governance logic.  This is particularly 
true when there is an opportunity to enhance the firm’s reputation by over-conforming with 
traditional practices (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), or there is an opportunity to enhance the firm’s 
financial performance by under-conforming with traditional practices that facilitate the pursuit of 
commercial interests (Garg, 2013; Geng et al., 2016).   
Conclusions 
 Overall, we seek to advance our understanding of when and how firms deviate from their 
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prevailing national governance logic with respect to corporate governance practices.  In so doing, 
we introduce the concept of governance deviance and point out that the same governance 
practice can be evaluated as deviant or conforming depending on the prevailing governance logic 
surrounding the organization.  We show that a firm’s entrepreneurial identity is the primary 
driver of corporate governance discretion, and that the range of socio-cognitive governance 
discretion will make deviance more or less likely.  Moreover, we argue that the extent of national 
regulatory enforcement and the firm’s overall governance capacity are important contingencies 
influencing the firm’s ultimate corporate governance deviance.  As such, we advance 
institutional theory research as well as contribute to a more holistic understanding of the 
comparative corporate governance literature.  Our conceptual model addresses the long-standing 
tension between organizational agency and institutional isomorphism by highlighting why some 
firms conform and others deviate within the same institutional context, and it opens up many 
new fascinating lines of inquiry for future research.  
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FIGURE 1 
Mid-Range Model of Comparative Corporate Governance Deviance 
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TABLE 1 
Typology of Corporate Governance Deviance 
 
Normative Perceptions within Corporate Governance Logic 
 
     Under-conformity         Over-conformity 
 
 









Notes:   
1. Typology only applies to firms with highly centralized entrepreneurial identities 
2. Two prevailing governance logics used to illustrate typology: 
a. Brazilian Dominant Governance Logic: High CEO Pay Gap normatively expected 
b. German Dominant Governance Logic: Moderate CEO Pay Gap normatively expected 
 
  
1. Commercial Mavericks 
 
Brazil: Petrobras  
     (low CEO pay gap) 
Germany: Deutsche Bank  
     (high CEO pay gap) 
2. Social Rebels  
 
Brazil: Sitawi  
     (low CEO pay gap) 
Germany: SAP  
     (high CEO pay gap) 
3. Commercial Rate-Busters 
Brazil: Vale  
   (high CEO pay gap) 
Germany: Lidl  
    (low CEO pay gap) 
4. Social Angels 
 
Brazil: Natura Cosmeticos  
     (high CEO pay gap) 
Germany: Gesundkostwerk  
     (low CEO pay gap) 
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